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THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE MINING ACTIVITIES
ON FEDERAL PUBLIC LANDS
Carol E. Schmidi*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The development and management of our natural resources are
sources of conflict between state, local, and federal governments. Private
mining activity on public lands often exemplifies the conflicts that arise
among government agencies. The Mining Act of 18721 is the starting point
for the acquisition of hardrock minerals on federal public lands. Through
the enactment of this Act, Congress gave its approval to the basic rules and
customs of the local mining districts. 2 Despite the emergence of new
legislation, the policy behind mineral development-to foster and encourage private enterprise in the development of mineral resources aremains unchanged since the Mining Act of 1872.
Mineral development is seen as vital to the country's national growth
and development, yet which government regulates the manner of development remains a continuing debate. A multitude of inseparable factors may
lead to inconsistent results. Two recent cases addressing the regulation of
private mining activity on public lands, GraniteRock Co. v. California
Coastal Commission4 and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission,5 exemplify these different results. 6 Consis-

tency is needed in this area so that state and local policies are not
frustrated.
This comment first addresses three of the factors involved in determining which government regulates private mining activity on federal public
lands. Parts II, III, and IV address the development of the property clause,
the effects of federalism on mining regulation, and the application of the
preemption doctrine. Part V then surveys recent cases with a special
emphasis on Granite Rock Co. and Gulf Oil Corp.
* The author would like to thank the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation for the grant
which helped to make this article possible.
This article placed second in the Natural Resource Section of TheAmerican Bar Association 1986

student writing competition.
I.

Act of May 10, 1872, 17 Stat. 91-96 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).

2.

1 AMERICAN

LAW OF MINING

§ 4.11(I) (2d ed. 1984).

3. Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1982).
4. 590 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd,768 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1985), appealgranted,54
U.S.L.W 3644 (U.S. March 31, 1986) (No. 85-1200).
5. 693 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1985).
6. See infra notes 117-56 and accompanying text.
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The United States' Constitution, under the authority of article IV,7
grants the federal government power over "[tihe Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States."" Article IV property includes all
federal public lands within a state's boundaries that are not classified as
article I property. Article I," a jurisdictional clause, applies to federal
enclaves such as military bases and some national parks. The source of
federal power separates these two classifications of federal property.
Article I property includes lands initially held by the states and subsequently acquired by the federal government; thus the federal government's
powers are derived from the states. On the other hand, the United States'
sovereign powers allows it control over article IV property. 10 Debates over
which government's regulations govern private mining activities on public
lands centers on article IV property.
Two divergent views exist on the proper interpretation of the article
IV property clause." One view, adopted by the United States Supreme
Court, states that article IV gives Congress unlimited power over federal
public lands. 2 The other view, commonly known as the classic property
clause doctrine,' 3 demands a more narrow reading of article IV. The latter
view, which limits the federal government's rights over article IV property,
is less well known and thus is more fully explained in the following
discussion.
The classic property clause doctrine developed in the early nineteenth
century.'4 The article IV element of the classic property clause doctrine
proclaims that the states have general governmental jurisdiction over the
federal public lands.' 5 Under the classic property clause doctrine, the
United States' rights over article IV property is limited similarly to that of

7. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.2 ("[C]ongress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States .... ")
8. Id.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.17 ("The Congress shall have Power ... to exercise exclusive
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever. . . over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of
the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and
...
)
other needful Buildings.
10. See G. COGGINS, C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW, 144-45
(1981).
II. Id. at 145.
12. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539-43 (1976).
13. For an elaborate discussion of the classic property clause doctrine see Engdahl, State and
Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REv. 283 (1976).
14. Id. at 288-300.
15. Id. at 296. The other basic element of the classic property clause doctrine states that the
United States has exclusive jurisdiction over federal property covered by article 1. Id.

1986]

MINING ON PUBLIC LANDS

a proprietor.16

An early United States Supreme Court decision, Pollard'sLessee v.
Hagan,1 7 articulated the article IV element of the classic property clause
doctrine. " Pollardaddressed the question of the states' authority over the

bed and banks of a navigable river within a state's boundaries.1 9 In Pollard,
the Court reasoned that lands in the territories acquired from foreign

powers and lands ceded by the states were held in trust by the United
States.2 0 Once a new state formed within the territory, the title to and

jurisdiction of lands invested with a public use21 transferred from the
United States to the newly created state. No specific grant or cession by the

United States was
required; title and jurisdiction vested automatically in
22
the new state.
The reasons for the basic position articulated in Pollardwere twofold.
The first reason, known as the equal footing doctrine, stated that all new

states shall be admitted into the Union on the same footing as the existing
states. A new state would not be on equal footing with the existing states if

the United States retained jurisdiction over the public domain within a new
state's boundaries. 23 The second reason, based on the doctrine of enumerated powers,24 stated that only article I specified the property over which
the federal government could exercise general governmental jurisdiction.2 5
Although the Court's holding in Pollardapplied only to those lands
invested with a public use, commentators contend that the Court's

rationale carried implications for the entire public domain. 6 In Pollard,
16. Id.
17. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
18. A few of the other cases relied upon by Engdahl to develop the classic property clause
doctrine include Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836), Wilson v. Cook,
327 U.S. 474 (1946), Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228 (1925), Omaechevarrie v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343
(1918), Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907), Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896), and Fort
Leavenworth Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885). See generallyEngdahl, supranote 13, at
288-348.
19. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 213.

20. Id. at 222-24.
21. Prior to the United States' acquisition of lands within the Louisana Purchase, certain lands,
held by the Kings of France and Spain but dedicated to public use, were known as "common" lands.
These comon lands, acquired by the United States from foreign powers, were equated with the common
lands in the territories which had been ceded by the states of the Union. In both instances the court in
Pollardreasoned that the United States held these common lands in trust for new states formed within
these territories. Id. See also Engdahl, supra note 13, at 293-94.
22. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223.
23. Id. at 223, 228-29.
24. The doctrine of enumerated powers encompasses the idea that the central government has
only those enumerated powers explicitly delegated by the Constitution; all other powers are reserved by
the states and the people. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 121-22 (1983).
25. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223-24.
26. Engdahl, supra note 13, at 295. The lands invested with a public use, also known as the
common lands, comprised a very small percentage of the lands in which the United States obtained title
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the Court stated that title to lands not invested with a public use would be
retained by the United States.2 7 Stressing the Court's rationale of equal
footing and enumerated powers, commentators point out that the retention
of title must be distinguished from governmental jurisdiction.2 8 Under the
classic property clause doctrine, the federal government retains title over
article IV property but lacks the constitutional power to exercise general
governmental jurisdiction over these lands. Lacking constitutional authority, the federal government does not have the power to override, or
29
preempt, the state's laws when issues occur involving article IV property.
Another aspect of the classic property clause doctrine is the United
States' proprietary role over article IV property.30 The United States as a
proprietor has the same rights as any private landowner. Since state law
defines and limits proprietor's rights, the United States is also subject to
these state laws. The United States' policies as a proprietor were often
executed through federal legislation; yet under the classic property clause
doctrine, these policies affecting article IV property do not necessarily take
precedence over state law. 31 The proprietary rights differ from the United
States' powers as a government. Governmentally, the United States has all
the powers which allows it to function as a sovereign and which do not
inherently include general governmental jursidiction over federal public
lands. The United States' sovereign powers are not restricted by state
2
laws.1
These characteristics of the classic property clause doctrine allow the
states broad authority over the public domain located within their
boundaries. During the past 120 years, however, the accumulation of a
series of independent events caused the gradual erosion of the classic
property clause doctrine.3 3 Confusion and uncertainty developed around
the respective state and federal powers over the federal public lands.
Kleppe v. New Mexico," a United States' Supreme Court decision, ended
the uncertainty. The Kleppe Court, after examining a line of precedent, 35

through the acquisition of the territories. Id.
27. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223.
28. Engdahl, supra note 13, at 295.
29. See generally id. at 288-300.
30. Id. at 296.
31. Id. at 308-09.
32. Id. at 309-10.
33. Events cited as causing the gradual erosion of the classic property clause doctrine include the
merging of the article I and article IV traditional property concepts, the uncertainty found in some
lower courts' decisions, misconstruction of the Supreme Court's dicta, and the failure of attorneys and
judges to adequately assess the precedents. Id. at 339-41, 351-52.
34. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
35. Some of the cases the Kleppe Court relied upon in reaching its decision include Camtield v.
United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897), United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940), Utah Power
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held that under article IV Congress has the complete power to enact
37
3
legislation affecting the public lands. 1 Since the supremacy clause
allows the federal government power to override conflicting state legislation, the Court held that the outer boundaries of the federal government's
power under the article IV property clause was not yet known.3 8
The Court in Kleppe drastically undermined the classic property
clause doctrine by interpreting article IV as giving Congress complete
power over the federal public lands. Subsequent decisions have erased any
initial doubts about the validity of the Kleppe holding.3 9 Although the
Court in Kleppe clearly stated that Congress has complete power over the
federal public lands, the different views on the proper interpretation of the
property clause remain. These different views may be one source which
have contributed to the continuing conflict between the respective state and
federal powers over federal public lands.

III.

FEDERALISM -

ITS EFFECTS ON THE REGULATION OF MINING

Federalism, the division of power between federal and state governments, constitutes a cornerstone on which our government was built. The
purpose of federalism, along with the separation of powers, is to maintain a
check on the growth of centralized power.40 The precise balance among the
different levels of government remains elusive and controversial as our
perceptions of the proper balance evolves through time.
Since the beginning of our country's history, the overwhelming trend
has been the expansion of the federal government through the increased
centralization of power, rules, and regulations. 41 Recent efforts to reduce
the federal government's increased power includes President Ronald
Reagan's "New Federalism" 42 and Western politicians' attempts to
expand states' rights in the West by organizing the Sagebrush Rebellion.43
& Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917), Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911),

Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958), United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19
(1947), Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92 (1871), and United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14
Pet.) 526 (1840).

36. 426 U.S. at 539-41.
37. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ...shall
be the supreme Law of the Land .
)
38.

426 U.S. at 539.

39. See, e.g., Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979), Minnesota ex
rel. Alexanderv. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), Kleinv. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511 (11 th Cir. 1985), Citizens for a Better Henderson v. Hodel, 768 F.2d
1051 (9th Cir. 1985).
40. Lyons, FederalismandResource Development: A New Rolefor States?, 12 ENVTL. L. 931,
931-32 (1982).
41. Id. at 932-33.
42. State of the Union Address, 128 CONG. REc. H51-55 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1982).
43. The Sagebrush Rebellion stems from the dissatisfaction of those living in the Western states
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The "New Federalism" focuses on reducing federal activity in domestic
matters and increasing the power of local and state governments." The
Sagebrush Rebels advocated a proposal to decrease centralization of
federal power and its bureaucracy by transferring the federal lands to state
ownership. Despite these recent efforts, the federal government retains

primary control.
Increased centralization of power in the federal government is a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, the growing federal government
arguably fails to adequately address local needs and concerns.4 5 The
environmental and energy programs are especially illustrative of the need

for local control. 46 Commentators stress that states are becoming
'47
"[v]estigial governments. . . mere agents of the federal bureaucracy.
On the other hand, some commentators conclude that the federal government is best suited, at least at the present time, to protect the quality of our
lives, our liberty, and our environment.4 8
The question remains as to which government is the better steward of
our natural resources. Cooperative federalism emphasizes the return of
responsibility to the states and local governments where they can exercise
local options. At the same time, cooperative federalism stresses the
practical, working relationship between state, local, and federal govern51
ments.4 9 Recent court decisions5 and state and federal legislation

with Congress' policy to retain public lands. The proponents of the Rebellion argue that Westerners
have no control over the decisionmaking process that directly affects them, federally imposed standards
and regulations bear little relation to Western needs, and large federal holdings within a state adversely
affects the states' economy. Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Controlthe PublicLands?,
1980 UTAH L. REV. 505, 509-12.
44. McGinley, Federalism Lives! Reflections on the Vitality of the Federal System in the
Context of Natural Resource Regulation, 32 U. OF KAN. L. REv. 147, 148 (1983).
45. Some of the factors cited as evidence of the federal government's inability to adequately
address local needs include the size of the federal government, inflexible federal requirements, and the
goal of achieving uniformity at the expense of unique local conditions. Harris, Redefining the State
Regulatory Role, 12 ENVTL. L. 921, 921-22 (1982).
46. Id. at 921.
47. Lyons, supra note 40, at 931 (citing Lyons, Federalism and the Regulation of Surface
Mining: Cooperationor Coercion? in COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS' SYMPOSIUM OF SURFACE
MINING (1980)).
48. The inability or refusal of the states to effectively protect against the deterioration of our
lands, waters, and air and the ability of special interest groups to influence the state and local legislative
bodies to the detriment of our natural resources are two of the factors which have lead commentators to
conclude that the federal government is better suited to protect the federal public lands. McGinley,
supra note 44, at 159-60. See also Huffman, Governing America's Resources: Federalism in the
1980s, 12 ENVTL. L. 863, 888-91 (1982).
49. Lyons, supra note 40, at 934.
50. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
51. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (note
especially § 1535), Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. 11983) (note especially
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demonstrate the incorporation of cooperative federalism.
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,5 2 a United States Supreme
Court decision pertaining to minerals taxation, evidences the use of
cooperative federalism. In Commonwealth Edison Co., the Court allowed
the state government to guard against the cost of the development and the
problems arising with eventual resource depletion by upholding Montana's
30% coal severance tax. 53 The Supreme Court held that (1) Montana's
severance tax did not violate the commerce clause 54 and (2) the tax did not
conflict with the supremacy clause by being inconsistent with the Mineral
Leasing Act of 192055 as amended. 5 1 State control over the coal severance
tax allows state governments to address local needs and thus illustrates the
effective cooperation that can exist between the different levels of
government.
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 57 (SMCRA),
exemplifies the principle of cooperative federalism in federal legislation.
Initially, SMCRA did not allow the states an opportunity to develop or
operate regulatory programs. The disastrous effect of that practice soon
became apparent. 58 Land management practices which effectively balance
environmental protection and mining activities in one part of the country
are not workable in other parts of the country.5 9 The states' ability to
develop workable remedies for unique, local problems was soon seen as
crucial to the success of SMCRA. At present, SMCRA demands a strong
state role.6 0 The flexibility already built into SMCRA allows the states to
tailor national environmental protection requirements to unique local
conditions. The Office of Surface Mining has relegated itself to a secondary
role in which it "[m] onitors and assists states to assure that they can and do
perform as required by the Act and that sound environmental protection is
achieved.""1
Other areas of federal land management, besides mining, have also
incorporated the principle of cooperative federalism. The Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA) of 197262 provides for a significant state role in
decisions concerning our national resources in coastal zones. Under the

§§ 1315, 1319, 1342(b)).
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

453 U.S. 609 (1981).
Id. at 636-37.
Id. at 614-29.
30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
453 U.S. at 632-33.
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
Harris, supra note 45, at 923-24.
Lyons, supra note 40, at 935.
Harris, supra note 45, at 926.
Id. at 930.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
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CZMA, once a state's coastal management plan has been approved by
Washington, the consistency clause6 3 provides that all proposed federal
activities must be consistent with the state's plan. Although the CZMA
recognizes the importance of national policies, the states have considerable
leverage over decisions concerning land use activities. 4
Another example where states are allowed some degree of control is in
the area of nuclear regulation. In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,6 5 an
Oklahoma state law 66 provided remedies for those injured by a nuclear
plant's safety violations. 7 The United States Supreme Court held that the
Oklahoma state law was not preempted by federal statutes.6 6
Despite the federal government's dominant control over the management of natural resources on public lands, the states are now becoming
equipped with proper legislation to address local needs and concerns.
When national requirements are flexible, states are able to adapt the
national standards to meet local concerns. At the same time, states must
guard against enacting statutes that conflict with federal statutes and
regulations since federal law will prevail when a conflict occurs.
IV.

JURISDICTION OVER THE PUBLIC LANDS AND THE ROLE OF THE

PREEMPTION DOCTRINE

Properly applying the preemption doctrine is paramount in determining the balance between state and federal regulatory control on public
lands. When Congress has the authority to act, the preemption doctrine
provides that the federal legislation shall override conflicting state legislation.69 In the absence of conflicting federal legislation, the states' police
powers extend to public lands and thus states' rules and regulations are
70
enforceable.
Lack of a unified approach to the doctrine's application has caused
confusion and uncertainty in determining when state legislation is pre71
empted by federal legislation and when there is concurrent jurisdiction.

63. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(2) (1982) ("Any Federal agency which shall undertake any
development project in the coastal zone of a state shall insure that the project is, to the maximum extent
practicable, consistent with approved state management programs.")
64. Finnell, Intergovernmental Relationshipsin Coastal Land Management, 25 NAT. RES. J.
31, 32 (1985).
65. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
66. OKLA. STAT. tit., 23 § 9 (1981) provides for an award of punitive damages "[iln any action
for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed."
67. 464 U.S. at 246.
68. Id. at 257-58.
69. NOWAK, ROTUNDA, YOUNG, supra note 24, at 292-96.
70. See generally id.
71. Comment, Preemption Doctrine in the Environmental Context: A Unified Method of
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The vacillation of the doctrine's application is often attributed to prevailing
concepts of federalism. 2 Despite the inconsistency of application, general
principles are recognized in applying the preemption doctrine.
Recent decisions embrace a two-step inquiry. The threshold inquiry
is whether Congress intended its legislation to occupy the field in
question. 4 If no intent to occupy the field is found, the courts
move to the
75
second step: whether state law conflicts with federal law.
In addressing the threshold question, the courts first look for an
explicit or implicit intent by Congress to occupy the field by considering
several factors. First, the United States Supreme Court notes that the
preemption doctrine is not to be applied lightly.76 The assumption is that
the federal legislation must exhibit a "clear and manifest" purpose to
supercede the states' police power before there is preemption.7 7 Furthermore, any doubts about Congressional purpose should favor the states."
Second, a significant consideration in determining federal preemption
is the area of law. Preemption is more likely found in areas such as foreign
affairs and labor relations where the emphasis is upon the national interest.
In other areas, such as consumer protection and environmental regulation,
there is less likelihood of preemption since the emphasis is on protecting the
states' interest and promoting cooperative federalism. 9
Third, legislative history is frequently examined to determine whether
there is Congressional intent to have a joint federal-state regulation of the
area. Where joint federal-state regulation or state enforcement of stricter
standards exists, an implicit federal intent to occupy the field is less likely
found. Environmental regulation is one of the areas in which Congress has
allowed states to enforce stricter standards."'
Finally, the courts examine the comprehensiveness of the federal
legislation. Courts reject any conclusion that comprehensiveness alone
demonstrates a federal intent to occupy the entire field. 81 Complex areas of
Analysis, 127 U. OF PA. L. REV. 197, 199 (1978).
72. Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger
Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 626 (1975).
73. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,248 (1984), Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1984).
74. "To occupy the field" is a term frequently used by the courts to identify when the federal
government has claimed exclusive jurisdiction of a particular area so that state action is no longer
permitted. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 558 (5th ed. 1983).
75. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 257, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d at 495.
76. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952).
77. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).

78.

Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261, 275 (1943).

79. Morseburgv.Balyon,621 F.2d 972,976-77 (9th Cir. 1980).See also Note, supranote 72, at
638-39.
80. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 726 F.2d 483, 489-90 (9th Cir. 1984).
81. " Id. at 491. See also New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415
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law, such as nuclear energy regulations or federal marine environmental
regulations, require complex and comprehensive regulations to govern the
area sufficiently; yet this factor alone does not necessitate federal
82
preemption.
If courts find no intent to occupy the field, they next examine whether
the state law conflicts with the federal law by using one of two standards:
the "actual" conflict or the "potential" conflict standard. The disposition of
the preemption challenge often hinges upon which standard courts
employ. 83 The actual conflict standard requires that there be "[s]uch
conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in
the same area. . *"84 Requiring actual conflict operates in favor of the
validity of the state statutes.8 5 Application of the potential conflict
standard is more difficult. It may involve a "determination that the state
law frustrates an implied congressional intent"8 6 or stands "as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." 87 Potential conflict may also simply involve finding a "danger
of conflict." 88 The use of the potential conflict standard favors federal
preemption.8 9
In determining whether there is a conflict, the courts look to the goals
and objectives of both federal and state statutes as well as to the facts of
each case. 90 The apparent trend is that when there is merely a potential
conflict, the courts will not apply the preemption doctrine. 9 1 The rationale
behind requiring more than a potential conflict is that there is time to
consider statutory conflicts when they actually occur. This trend is
consistent with the principles of cooperative federalism since under
cooperative federalism courts do not conclude that federal law preempts
state regulatory authority unless absolutely necessary.
V.

A

SURVEY OF RECENT CASES AND A HARMONIZING PRINCIPLE

The divergent views on the historical development of the property
clause, the ever changing views of federalism, and the inconsistent
application of the preemption doctrine have all contributed to the confu-

(1973).
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Dublino, 413 U.S. at 415.
Comment, supra note 71, at 203-04.
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
Comment, supra note 71, at 204.
Id. (citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165-68 (1978)).
Comment, supra note 71, at 204 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
Comment, supra note 71, at 204 (citing Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505 (1956)).
Comment, supra note 71, at 204.
See generally Note, supra note 72, at 628-39.
Id. at 653.
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sion of'determining when state or federal law or both control private mining
activity on federal public lands. At first, case law appears split on whether
to allow states to regulate private mining activity on federal lands, but a
"harmonizing principle" has emerged. This harmonizing principle suggests that if state and local laws regulate rather than determine federal
land uses they may not be preempted by federal laws.92 Additionally, as
long as state and local governments do not prohibit federally authorized
actions, states are allowed to apply more stringent regulations to federal
mining leases and hard rock mining developments than what is required
under federal legislation.93 Under this harmonizing principle, state and
local governments are allowed to adequately consider and provide for
unique environmental conditions. Case law appears to follow this principle.
A. Case Law Prior to 1985
The Idaho Supreme Court in State ex rel.Andrus v. Click94 upheld a
state law requiring miners to obtain state permits which required compliance with Idaho's environmental regulations before being allowed to
dredge mine on the federal public lands. 95 The court found no explicit or
implicit congressional intent in federal mining law to preempt state
regulation of dredge mining. 96 In determining whether a conflict existed
between state and federal laws the court noted that use of more stringent
state law did not make it impossible for the miners to exercise the rights
granted by the federal mining laws. Thus, the court held that the state law
was a constitutional exercise of state power and found no preemption of the
state law.9 7 Furthermore, the court noted that environmental regulation is
particularly suited to state control. 98 The miners appealed to the United
States Supreme Court but were denied certiorari. 99
Likewise, in State of Oregon ex rel. Cox v. Hibbard,100 miners
appealed a decree enjoining them from removing material from Forest
Creek in Oregon without first obtaining a state permit. 101 The Oregon
Court of Appeals, finding neither congressional intent to occupy the field
nor a conflict between state and federal laws, held that neither the United
92. Note, State and Local Control ofEnergy Development on Federal Lands, 32 STAN. L. REv.
373, 386 (1980).
93. Id.
94. 97 Idaho 791, 554 P.2d 969 (1976).
95. Id. at 799, 554 P.2d at 977.
96. Id. at 798, 554 P.2d at 976.
97. Id. at 796, 804, 554 P.2d at 974, 982.
98. Id. at 798, 554 P.2d at 976.
99. 102 Idaho443,631 P.2d 614(1981), cert. denied sub nom. Click'v. Idaho ex rel. Evans, 457
U.S. 1116 (1982).
l00. 31 Or. App. 269, 570 P.2d 1190 (1977).
101. Id. at _, 570 P.2d at 1191-92.
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States Constitution nor the federal mining laws preempted the state's
authority requiring miners to obtain state permits. 02
The courts in Click and Hibbard allowed separate state permitting
processes as a means to enforce environmental regulations. The courts
allowed stricter standards than required by federal law as long as the state
regulations did not prohibit the authorized activity.
Cases involving permits which prohibit rather than regulate federally
authorized uses of the public domain are consistent with this harmonizing
principle. In Ventura County v. GulfOil Corp.,'"3 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the Mineral Lands Leasing Act' 04 preempted the
county's power to require a lessee of the United States to obtain a county
permit before drilling on federal public lands.10 5 The court held that since
Congress had specifically authorized drilling of oil on federal lands, the
county could not prohibit the activity either permanently or
temporarily. 0 6
In Elliot v. Oregon InternationalMining Co., 0 7 the Oregon Court of
Appeals held that Congress had specifically authorized mineral claimants
to enter land for purposes of mining and removing valuable mineral
deposits and thus the county could not prohibit the action by a county
ordinance.' 0 8 The court distinguished Hibbardby noting that the county
ordinances in Elliot completely prohibited a mineral claimant from
conducting surface mining on patented land, whereas in Hibbard, local
regulations merely supplemented federal mining law.' 0 9
Brubaker v. Board of County Commissioners"0 is another case that
supports this harmonizing principle. In Brubaker, holders of unpatented
mining claims located on federal lands sought to conduct limited test

102. Id. at -_, 570 P.2d at 1195.
103. 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979), afl'd mem., 445 U.S. 947 (1980).
104. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
105. 601 F.2d at 1086.
106. Id. at 1084-86. Commentators have criticized the Venturadecision and have stated that as
a result of the decision the states have lost the power to regulate mineral development on federal public
lands. See e.g., Note, Public Land Law: Preemption ofState Regulationof Mineral Development on
the Public Domain, Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 16 TULSA L.J. 317, 333 (1980). Yet when
narrowly read, the Ventura decision is consistent with the harmonizing principle. While this article
does not address the propriety of the Ventura decision, the court in Venturadid determine that Ventura
County sought to prohibit an authorized activity. Id. at 1084. Although the boundaries between
regulating, strictly regulating, and prohibiting an activity are vague, they are not synonymous forms of
regulating. Thus the courts should carefully determine the degree of regulations enacted by the local
and state governments before determining whether the regulations prohibit a federally authorized
activity.
107. 60 Or. App. 474, 654 P.2d 663 (1982).
108. Id. at -,
654 P.2d at 668.
109. Id. at -,
654 P.2d at 667-68.
110. Colo. -,
652 P.2d 1050 (1982).
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drilling. After receiving federal approval, the holders applied for a special
permit to conduct the drilling from the El Paso County Board of County
Commissioners. The Commissioners denied the permit. ""' The Colorado
Supreme Court held that the preemption doctrine prohibited the Commissioners from barring mining activities on federal public lands that are
specifically authorized by federal statutes. " 2 The court did concede that
although local statutes cannot prohibit federally authorized activities, they
can supplement the federal scheme by placing reasonable regulations on
the use of federal lands. 113 The court noted that reasonable state regula-4
1
tions are more likely upheld if they are for environmental protection.
The court in Brubaker distinguished its decision from State ex rel.
Andrus v. Click on two grounds. First, Click involved placing reasonable
conditions on the issuance of a mining permit and did not involve the power
to prohibit mining on federal lands. Second, the miners in Click had not
actually applied for a permit.11 5 Thus, the question of whether
the state
11 6
could deny the actual permit was not before the court.
Thus, a survey of the cases through 1984 reveals a harmonizing
principle: if the state merely regulates rather than determines the federal
land uses, the state may not be preempted by federal law. In the next
sections, two 1985 decisions, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission and Granite Rock Co. v. CaliforniaCoastal
Commission, are examined to determine whether they are in concert with
this harmonizing principle.
B.

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission

In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 17 Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf) complied with Wyoming's statutes
and rules" by applying to the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission (Commission) for permission to drill in the Granite Ridge
Field of Sheridan County. 119 Gulf had proposed an access road, an
extension of the county road, which traversed national forest land as well as
III. Id. at -.._ 652 P.2d at 1052.
112. Id. at ...-_ 652 P.2d at 1052, 1059-60.
113.
114.
115.
116.
impossible
117.
118.

Id. at .-._ 652 P.2d at 1059.
Id.
Id. at ..-..652 P.2d at 1058-59.
The court in Click did note that the permit would be enforceable if it rendered mining
on federal lands. Click, 97 Idaho at 796, 554 P.2d at 974.
693 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1985).
§§ 30-5-101 to 126, W.S. 1977, and rules promulgated by the Wyoming Oil and Gas

Conservation Commission pursuant to § 30-5-104(c), W.S. 1977.
119.

693 P.2d at 230.
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lands owned jointly by Gulf and Texaco, Inc. 2 '
The Commission and citizens from Story, Wyoming contended that
the drilling and related activities would violate the Commission's rules and
regulations. A hearing was conducted. Testimony and evidence were
presented as to the feasibility and environmental consequences of the
proposed access to the site. 2 ' Based upon information obtained at the
hearing, the Commission approved Gulf's application for a permit to drill
on the condition that a different access route be selected. 1 22 Gulf filed a
petition with the district court for judicial review of the Commission's
decision. The district court certified the matter to the Wyoming Supreme
Court.'
The Supreme Court of Wyoming upheld the state's statute which
allowed the Commission to condition federally authorized drilling activities in order to safeguard environmental values.' 24 The court applied the
two-step approach in determining whether there was federal preemption.
First, the court found no intent by Congress to exclude states from
regulating mining activities, stating that Congress, "[f]ar from excluding
state participation, has prescribed a significant role for local governments
in the regulation of the environmental impact of mineral development on
federal land."' 2 5 Second, the court found no conflict between the state
statute and the federal mining and environmental laws. 12 6
Gulf Oil is in concert with the harmonizing principle. The Commission did not prohibit mining activity on federal lands, but did enact
restrictions so as to safeguard environmental values. The safeguarding of
environmental values by local and state governments has repeatedly been
approved by the United States Supreme Court.'2 7 Decisions such as Gulf
Oil advance cooperative federalism by allowing local and state governments to address local needs and concerns.
C.

Granite Rock Co. v. California Coastal Commission

Granite Rock Co. v. California Coastal Commission, 28 a recent
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, brings the issue of whether states

120. Id.
121. Id. at 230-31.
122. Id. at 232.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 238.
125. Id. at 235.
126. Id. at 238.
127. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 164 (1978); Askew v. American
Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 328-29 (1973).
128. 590 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D.Cal. 1984),rev'd,768 F.2d 1077 (9thCir. 1985),appeal granted,
54 U.S.L.W. 3644 (U.S. March 31, 1986) (No. 85-1200).
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have concurrent legislative power to regulate private mining activities on
federal lands to a head. Granite Rock Company (Granite Rock) engages in
commercial mining of chemical grade white limestone. The mining
operation is located on and around Mount Pico Blanco in the Big Sur region
of Los Padres National Forest along the coast of California.129 Granite
Rock's planned mining activities included "blasting and opening a quarry,
constructing and improving roads, building a bridge, boring test holes and
conducting core drilling, improving a water storage system, and sumping
rock waste in a disposal area."'130
Granite Rock submitted a five-year plan to the United States Forest
Service as required by federal law.131 The plan was approved and Granite
Rock began mining in 1981. In 1983, the California Coastal Commission
informed Granite Rock that it must apply for a state permit to continue its
mining activities in the Big Sur area. 132 The California Coastal Commission based its authority on state law which was enacted pursuant to the
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) of 19721'3 and approved by the
Secretary of Commerce. The CZMA encourages state regulation of the
coastal zones. 3 4 The "coastal zone" as defined by the CZMA and
California Coastal Commission includes Granite Rock's mining operation
in the Big Sur region.' 35
The state law 36 specifies that anyone seeking to develop resources
within the coastal zone must secure a permit from the California Coastal
Commission or a local commission.' 3 7 The state law mandates that the
permit shall be issued if the proposed development meets the statutory
requirements, which necessitates a consideration of marine and land
resources, scenic and visual qualities, and ocean access. 138
Granite Rock brought an action to enjoin the California Coastal
Commission from compelling it to comply with local permit requirements.' 3 The district court applied the two-step approach in determining
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

768 F.2d at 1079.
590 F. Supp. at 1366.
36 C.F.R. § 228.4 (1985).
768 F.2d at 1079.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982 & Supp. H 1984).

134. 768 F.2d at 1079. See 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2) ("to encourage and assist the states to exercise
effectively their responsibilities in the coastal zone through the development and implementation of
management programs to achieve wise use of the land and water resources of the coastal zone, giving
full consideration to ecological, cultural, historic, and esthetic values as well as to needs for economic
development .. ")
135. 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1) (1982).
136. CAL. PUB. RFs. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986).
137. Id. at § 30600.
138. Id. at §§ 30200-30255.
139. 590 F. Supp. at 1364.
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whether there was federal preemption. First, the court concluded that
Congress intended there to be "collaborative federal/state efforts" to
protect public lands and that this intent would be circumvented by
invalidating the state's permit. 4 0 Second, the court held that there was no
conflict between the federal and state regulations.' 4 ' The district court
denied Granite Rock's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the
1 42
action.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
decision and held that "[a]n independent state permit system to enforce
state environmental standards would undermine the Forest Service's own
permit authority and thus is preempted.' 4 3 In reaching this holding the
court relied on a 1946 United States Supreme Court decision, FirstIowa
44
Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Commission.
In First Iowa, a decision involving navigable waters of the United
States and interstate commerce, the Court focused on whether the State
of Iowa could require a cooperative association to obtain a state permit to
construct and operate a dam, reservoir and hydro-electric power plant on
the Cedar River near Moscow, Iowa. The Federal Power Commission
determined that the cooperative's plan for the dam, reservoir, and hydroelectric plant had met the requirements of the Federal Power Act.1 46 The
State of Iowa, however, alleged that the cooperative must comply with the
state statutory requirements 14 7 as well as the federal requirements for the
dam project. 148 The United States Supreme Court held that the state law
was preempted because Congress had determined that the Federal Power
Commission and not the states had control of the project's requirements. 4 9
The Ninth Circuit, by concluding that the state permitting process
intrudes into the Forest Service's power to prohibit or restrict mining for
failure to abide by its environmental regulations, determined that the First
Iowa doctrine should apply to the GraniteRock Co. litigation.1 50 The court
first concluded that under federal regulations, 151 the Forest Service had the
authority to regulate mining on national forest land and to assure that the

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 1374.
Id.
Id. at 1375.
768 F.2d at 1083.
328 U.S. 152 (1946).
Id. at 163.
Id. at 159-60.
IOWA CODE §§ 7767-7796.1 (1939).
328 U.S. at 161.
Id. at 168-71.
768 F.2d at 1083.
36 C.F.R. §§ 228.4-.5 (1985).
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environmental requirements were met.152 Asking next whether the state's
authority to request a permit from Granite Rock intrudedinto the Forest
Service's sphere of authority, the court held that "[a] n independent state
permit system to enforce state environmental standards would undermine
the Forest Service's own permit authority and thus is preempted. 1 53 The
Ninth Circuit also noted that the Court in FirstIowa did not inquire into
the reasonableness of the state's conditions for issuing or denying the
permit.154
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in GraniteRock Co. and its reliance on
the FirstIowa doctrine is misplaced in the wake of more recent decisions
and developments. The court in GraniteRock Co. did not apply the twostep approach endorsed by the United States Supreme Court in determining whether there is federal preemption. The first step in the inquiry,
whether Congress intended to occupy the field, was not examined by the
court. There was no examination to determine whether the Forest Service's
regulations or the Mining Act had a "clear and manifest" purpose to
supercede the state's police power. Nor was the area of law and the
legislative history examined to determine congressional intent.
The court in GraniteRock Co. also did not address the second step of
the preemption doctrine; the determination of whether there is a conflict
between the state and federal regulations such that both could not be
applied to the same area. Although the court determined that the state's
permitting authority underminedthe Forest Service's authority, there was
no determination that the two statutes actually conflicted. If the court had
applied the two-step approach in GraniteRock Co., a different result may
have occurred.
Instead of applying the two-step approach which is endorsed by the
United States Supreme Court, the court in Granite Rock Co. asked
whether there was an intrusion by state authority upon the federal
authority. Exactly what constitutes an "intrusion" is a source of difficulty.
55
The United States Supreme Court in FloridaAvocado Growers v. Paull
held that "[t]he test of whether both federal and state regulations may
operate, or [whether] the state regulation must give way, is whether both
regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence
of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives." 15e Thus, although a state's regulation may have the same purpose
and thus may be said to intrude upon the federally authorized activities, it
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

768 F.2d at 1083.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1082.
373 U.S. 132 (1963).
Id. at 142.
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is not necessarily a basis for preemption.
In GraniteRock Co. the balance that exists between state, local, and
federal governments is weighted heavily in favor of the federal government. There was not a careful analysis of federal preemption and further,
the court did not consider the benefits of cooperative federalism. As a
result, the decision erodes the harmonizing principle that is developing in
this area of law. Granite Rock Co. is a step backward in the attempt to
clarify the conditions under which state or federal governments, or both,
can regulate private mining activities on federal public lands.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The precise balance between state, local, and federal regulation of
private mining activities on public lands has a long and complex history.
The fluctuation found within this area of law is not surprising considering
the many intervening factors. The different interpretations of the property
clause sets the stage by interjecting confusion and uncertainty into issues of
governmental jurisdiction on public lands. Although Kleppe reduced the
uncertainty, the trend toward cooperative federalism and the inconsistent
application of the preemption doctrine have kept the area in flux. There is
no single correct answer that can be applied in every case, yet recognition of
the benefits of cooperative federalism and consistent use of the two-step
approach in applying the preemption doctrine will lead to less confusion in
determining the balance between federal, state, and local regulation of
public lands.
The emergence of a harmonizing principle appears as a workable
solution to the balance between the powers asserted by federal, state, and
local governments. The harmonizing principle allows the state and local
governments to exercise local controls in accordance with their needs. At
the same time, as long as the state or local government does not prohibit,
but merely regulates the private mining interest, the policy of the United
States to foster and encourage private mining interest is not harmed.
The Granite Rock Co. decision conflicts with this harmonizing
principle. Besides not applying the two-step approach of the preemption
doctrine, the court did not consider the benefits of cooperative federalism
when addressing environmental issues. Granite Rock Co. adds to the
confusion in this area and further frustrates state and local governments in
their development of policies to safeguard the natural resources located on
federal public lands. Through federal legislation, such as the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act and the Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972, Congress has adopted national policies while allowing the
states a strong regulatory role. Courts should not circumvent this type of
cooperative relationship that is developing between state, local, and federal
governments.

